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Abstract
We study the role of labor market mismatch in the adjustment to a trade lib-
eralization that results in the o¤shoring of high-tech production. Our model features
two-sided heterogeneity in the labor market: high- and low-skilled workers are matched
in a frictional labor market with high- and low-tech rms. Mismatch employment oc-
curs when high-skilled workers choose to accept a less desirable job in the low-tech
industry. The main result is that this type of job displacement is actually benecial
for the labor market in the country doing the o¤shoring. The reason is that mismatch
allows this economy to reallocate domestic high-skilled labor across both high- and
low-tech industries. In doing so, this reallocation dampens both the increase in the
aggregate unemployment rate and the decline in aggregate wages that come as a conse-
quence of shifting domestic production abroad. From a policy perspective, this result
is perhaps counter-intuitive because it suggests that some degree of job dislocation is
actually desirable as it helps facilitate adjustment in the labor market following a trade
liberalization.
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1 Introduction
Improvements in transportation, information, and communication technologies over the past
30 years have led to greater internationalization of production processes. A key component of
this aspect of globalization has been an increase in the willingness of rms to o¤shore that is,
to hire foreign workers to do jobs that were previously done domestically.1 One consequence
of the increase in o¤shoring has been a backlash in public opinion regarding whether or
not this trend is desirable. Indeed, o¤shoring and, in particular, its impact on the labor
market is a controversial topic. The problem is all the more acute when we consider that
the e¤ects of o¤shoring may run beyond actual observed o¤shoring. Blinder (2009) makes the
point that while actual o¤shoring may have an important e¤ect on wages and employment,
the mere fact that certain jobs have characteristics that make them susceptible to o¤shoring
may also be an important driver of labor market outcomes.
There is a wide body of empirical evidence on the impact of o¤shoring on the labor
market.2 However, it is di¢ cult to extract a consistent theme at the aggregate level primarily
because the wage and labor market e¤ects tend to di¤er greatly depending on what specic
notion of o¤shoring is being considered and on the degree of disaggregation of the data being
studied. Indeed, no clear consensus emerges from these papers regarding whether or not a
strong backlash against o¤shoring is, in fact, justied.
One relatively underdeveloped area of the literature concerns the role of trade and job
dislocation, or the idea that high-skilled workers are forced into taking low-paying jobs.
Earlier work by Jacobson, Lalond, and Sullivan (1993) and Kletzer (2001) suggests that
job dislocation has an important role in the adjustment to globalization. More recently,
work by Hummels, Munch, and Xiang (2011) uses Danish micro-level data to show that
the adjustment costs for workers displaced due to o¤shoring tend to be higher than the
1The trend toward increased o¤shoring and more signicant foreign involvement by multinational enter-
prises more generally is documented in Crino (2009), for example.
2For example, early work by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997, and 1999) focuses on manufacturing
o¤shoring, while Amiti and Wei (2005) and Gorg and Hansely (2005) focus on the rapid growth in services
o¤shoring. These papers center primarily at the industry level. Taking yet a di¤erent approach, both Liu
and Treer (2008) and Ebenstein et al. (2011) try to measure the impact of o¤shoring using disaggregated
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). In still a di¤erent direction, Goos, Manning, and Salomons
(2011) examine the link between o¤shoring and changes in the occupational structure of employment.
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adjustment costs for workers displaced for other reasons.
In this paper, we try to better understand the link between job dislocation and o¤shoring
using a theoretical approach. Our analysis builds on Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko
(2008) henceforth DMS which, in turn, is an open economy extension of Albrecht and
Vroman (2002).
The model consists of two countries, called the North and South, each of which is endowed
with a labor force composed of both high- and low-skill individuals. Low-skill individuals
are only qualied for low-tech jobs, while high-skill individuals are qualied for both high-
and low-tech jobs.3 Upon entry into a market ex ante identical rms make an irreversible
investment decision to adapt one of two possible technologies: low- or high-tech production.
Free entry into vacancy posting is such that both high- and low-tech rms can exist within
any given country. In order to produce, rms match with workers in a labor market that is
characterized by search frictions as in Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). Given the di¤erent employment opportunities available to high-skill
workers, two types of equilibrium congurations are possible. In an ex-post segmented
(EPS) equilibrium high-skilled workers only accept high-tech jobs. Alternatively, under
certain conditions a cross-skill matching (CSM) equilibrium that is, one in which high-
skilled workers are willing to accept both high- and low-tech (mismatch) jobs can arise.
We make two improvements relative to the original model used in DMS. First, a key
limitation of the DMS setup is that there are no explicit international production linkages.
Our paper improves on this by introducing a richer production structure. Specically, we
assume that in the North there exists a multinational rm that produces output using a
exibly parameterized constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of domestic and
foreign (o¤shored) high-tech inputs. The second improvement is that our analysis is carried
out in a version of the model that is carefully calibrated using data from both the U.S. and
emerging market economies.
The paper has two main results. First, we show that mismatch employment helps mit-
igate adverse labor market consequences that arise as a result of o¤shoring. We show this
3This denition of skill, taken from Albrecht and Vroman (2002), is also used in Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Gautier (2002), Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2009), and Arseneau
and Epstein (2014a).
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by rst qualitatively reproducing the results in DMS under which a trade liberalization trig-
gers a switch from EPS to CSM equilibrium. We then isolate the e¤ect of mismatch by
forcing the economy from a post-liberalization CSM equilibrium (with mismatch) to a post-
liberalization EPS equilibrium (without mismatch). The di¤erence in allocations across the
two post-liberalization outcomes reveal that by allowing domestic high-skilled labor to real-
locate across both the remaining high- and low-tech industries, mismatch helps to dampen
both the increase in the unemployment rate and the decline in wages that result from shift-
ing domestic production abroad. This nding is essentially an open economy extension of
Albrecht and Vromans (2002) result on the impact of skill-biased technological change in
a closed economy setting. From a policy perspective, this result suggests that some degree
of mismatch is actually desirable from an aggregate perspective because it helps facilitate
adjustment in the labor market following a trade liberalization.
The second result is more technical in nature. We show that under our calibration the
size of the parameter space over which it is possible for mismatch to emerge as an equi-
librium outcome is limited. In particular, as long as the size of the high-tech o¤shoring
sector remains relatively small which appears to be the most empirically relevant case
highly-skilled workers will only choose to enter into mismatch employment if domestic and
foreign inputs are su¢ ciently complementary in the multinationals production function. If
the two inputs are instead viewed as substitutes, the calibrated economy lies in a part of the
parameter space where mismatch does not arise in a post-liberalization equilibrium.
In terms of related literature, beyond the empirical papers cited above, there is a large
body of literature, surveyed by Helpman (2006), on o¤shoring within the context of standard
trade theory with frictionless labor markets. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is a
relatively recent contribution. More recently, a growing number of studies have extended the
o¤shoring literature to include equilibrium unemployment. Examples of these studies include
Mitra and Ranjan (2010), Arseneau and Leduc (2012), and Ranjan (2013). In a slightly
di¤erent direction, both Oldenski (2014) and Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti (2012) study
the role of o¤shoring in the polarization of the U.S. labor force that is, the trend decline in
middle-income occupations. This paper is di¤erent from this earlier literature because like
DMS, which, in turn, builds on a long research agenda summarized in Davidson and Matusz
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(2009) it focuses on the interaction between o¤shoring and mismatch unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses our calibration strategy, and the main results are presented in Section
4. Section 5 addresses the sensitivity of our results to alternative parameterizations of the
multinationals production function. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding comments.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries that we refer to as the North and the South.
Each economy is inhabited by both high- and low-skilled workers, and there is no interna-
tional migration. In addition, in each economy there is a nal-output producing rm that
uses domestic low-tech intermediate products, only, as inputs. There is also a vertically
integrated multinational headquartered in the North that produces nal output as well, but
using high-tech intermediate inputs, only. In turn, intermediate inputs are produced using
labor. Each countrys nal output is non-tradable. Thus, trade occurs only in intermediate
goods.
Following related literature, we abstract from capital and assume that each intermediate
goods producer has only one job. Also, we follow DMS regarding production congurations
under autarky and trade. In autarky high-tech intermediate production occurs exclusively
in the North. Under trade, o¤shoring takes place and high-tech intermediate goods are
also produced in the South and sold to the North for use as inputs in the multinationals
production of nal output.
Each economys labor market is characterized by search frictions. In line with Albrecht
and Vroman (2002) and DMS, search is assumed to be undirected and we abstract from on-
the-job search. Undirected search simply means that per-period matches between rms and
job seekers are the result of an aggregate matching technology that is increasing in aggregate
vacancies and aggregate unemployment.4
4This can also be interpreted as random search, since the assumption of an aggregate meeting function
is such that individuals searching for employment may encounter job opportunities that they are unwilling
or unqualied to take. Alternatively, in the present context directed search would involve sectoral high-
and low-tech meeting functions that take as inputs sector-specic vacancies and searchers instead of their
aggregate counterparts. The existence of such sectoral meeting functions imply that workers are indeed able
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The labor market is structured such that low-skill workers in either economy are only
qualied for employment in jobs operated by the corresponding domestic low-tech intermedi-
ate producers. In contrast, high-skilled workers are in principle able to attain employment in
either the high-tech multinational via high-skilled workers in the North employed by high-
tech intermediate producers and high-skilled workers in the South employed by o¤shore
(high-tech) intermediate producers or a domestic low-tech intermediate producer.
Our assumptions regarding the skill content of jobs potentially gives rise to multiple
equilibria. Borrowing terminology from Albrecht and Vroman (2002), a cross skill matching
equilibrium (CSM) arises when a high-skilled worker is willing to accept a job paying a
lower wage in the low-tech sector in the interest of more quickly moving out of the state
of unemployment. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we refer to this type of labor
market outcome in CSM equilibrium as mismatch employment. In contrast, an ex-post
segmentation equilibrium (EPS) arises when high-skilled workers are unwilling to accept
low-tech jobs. The conditions under which each of the noted matches can arise are discussed
in Section 2.3 following development of the model.
Of note, CSM and EPS equilibria are not mutually exclusive: Under certain parame-
ter congurations both equilibria can exist simultaneously. For the Southern economy, in
absence of o¤shoring CSM equilibrium obtains trivially because low-tech jobs are the only
source of employment. Beyond that special case, as in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and
DMS we abstract from formal modeling mechanisms that may lead to equilibrium selection.
2.1 The Northern Economy
The Northern economy is inhabited by a population of innitely lived individuals with unit
mass, all of whom always participate in the labor market. A fraction  2 (0,1) of the
Northern labor force consists of low-skilled workers (L). The remaining 1  fraction of the
labor force consists of high-skilled workers (H).
The price of nal output is normalized to unity. Both nal and intermediate producers are
price takers in the product market. Final goods producers are also price takers in the inputs
to only search for jobs that they are qualied for and are actually willing to take. See Epstein (2012) and
Arseneau and Epstein (2014a) for more on this topic.
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market. However, hiring of labor at the intermediate production stage is subject to search
frictions implying bargaining power for both workers and intermediate producers. Given this
bargaining power, following related search literature we assume that wages are negotiated
via Nash bargaining with no commitment to the future path of wages (that is, wages can be
instantaneously renegotiated given changes in the economic environment). High- and low-
tech intermediate producers ll open positions through vacancy posting. Moreover, free entry
into vacancy posting is such that both high- and low-tech intermediate producers coexist.
2.1.1 Production
Final output produced using low-tech (L) intermediate inputs is given by YL = ZLNL, where:
ZL is technology; and NL is the total amount of low-tech intermediate inputs. As noted
earlier, we assume that all product markets both nal goods and intermediate goods are
perfectly competitive and that nal goods producers are price takers in the input market.
Letting pL denote the price of low-tech intermediate input, the prot-maximization problem
of nal goods production using low-tech intermediate inputs is:
max
NL
ZLNL   pLNL.
Thus, in equilibrium
pL = ZL. (1)
Since each intermediate producer has only one job, then NL = zL"L+zMeM , where: zL is the
productivity of a match between a low-skill worker and a low-tech intermediate producer;
"L is the mass of low-skilled individuals working for intermediate low-tech producers; zM is
the productivity of a mismatch employment relationship; and eM is the mass of mismatch
(high-skilled) individuals working for intermediate low-tech producers (in CSM equilibrium
eM > 0 and in EPS equilibrium eM = 0). Alternatively, "L+eM is also the mass of low-
tech intermediate producers that are operating at any given point in time. It follows that
yL = pLzL, where yL is the value of output for a low-tech intermediate producer matched
with a low-skill individual, and yM = pLzM is the value of mismatch output.
The multinational produces nal goods YH , and can do so using domestic intermediate
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high-tech (H) inputs and high-tech inputs produced in the South via o¤shoring (O). We
assume the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
YH = ZH [(NH)
 + (1  )(NO)]1=, (2)
where: ZH is technology; NH is total amount of domestic high-tech intermediate inputs;
NO is total amount of o¤shore (high-tech) intermediate inputs; and the parameters  and
 are, respectively, the share of domestic intermediate high-tech inputs and the degree of
substitutability between domestic and o¤shore intermediate high-tech inputs.5 In the ab-
sence of trade,  = 1. Note that the multinational production function establishes explicit
international linkages between countries, which is an innovation of our modeling approach
relative to DMS, where no explicit international linkages are considered.
The prot-maximization problem of the multinational is:
max
NH , NO
ZH [(NH)
 + (1  )(NO)]1=   pHNH   pONO,
where: pH is the price of high-tech Northern intermediate inputs; and pO is the price of
o¤shore inputs. The rst-order conditions imply that:
pH = ZH(NH)
 1[(NH) + (1  )(NO)]1= 1; (3)
and:
pO = ZH(1  )(NO) 1[(NH) + (1  )(NO)]1= 1. (4)
NH = zH"H and NO = zO"O, with analogous interpretation as earlier. In particular, "H
is the mass of Northern high-skilled workers employed by Northern high-tech intermediate
producers and "O is the mass of Southern high-skilled individuals employed by o¤shore
intermediate producers. It follows that for i 2 fH,Og yi = pizi, where yi is the value of
output for a type-i intermediate producer.
5 = 1 implies perfect substitutability,  =  1 implies perfect complementarity, and  = 0 is the
Cobb-Douglas production-function case.
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2.1.2 Matching Process
Let m denote matches per period. In line with related literature, m is assumed to be in-
creasing and concave in aggregate vacancies, v, and aggregate unemployment, u. Aggregate
vacancies are equal to the sum of low- and high-tech vacancies posted by intermediate pro-
ducers, respectively vL and vH . Similarly, aggregate unemployment is equal to the sum of
the masses of low- and high-skill unemployed individuals, respectively uL and uH . Note that
because the population consists of a unit mass and all individuals participate in the labor
force, then u is also the aggregate unemployment rate.
L 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of unemployed low-skilled individuals relative to total unem-
ployment, that is, L = uL=u. In addition, q = m=v is meetings per vacancy, that is, the
rate at which intermediate producers with open positions meet workers. It follows that qH ,
where H = 1  L, is the rate at which any intermediate producer with a vacancy meets a
low-skill unemployed worker, and qH is the rate at which any intermediate producer with a
vacancy meets a high-skill unemployed worker. Note that all meetings between workers and
rms do not result in a match. Indeed, when a low-skill worker and a high-tech intermediate
producer meet, no match is formed, which is also the case when a high-skill worker and a
low-tech intermediate producer meet in EPS equilibrium.
Let L denote the fraction of low-tech vacancies relative to aggregate vacancies, that
is,  = vL=v. In addition, f = m=u is the rate at which unemployed individuals of any
type meet intermediate producers with vacancies of any given type. Thus, an unemployed
individual meets a rm with a low-tech vacancy at e¤ective rate fL and meets a rm with
a high-tech vacancy at e¤ective rate fH , where H = 1  L.
2.1.3 Value Functions
Intermediate Producers For i; j 2 fL,Hg and i = j the value to a Northern intermediate
producer of type i from employing a type-j worker, Ji, satises:
rJi = yi   c  wi   (Ji   Vj),
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where: r is the interest rate in the Northern economy; c is the Northern xed ow cost of
posting a vacancy and maintaining a job; yj is the value of output of a match as dened
earlier; wi is the Nash bargained wage;  is the exogenous economy-wide rate of job destruc-
tion in the North; and Vi is the value of an unlled vacancy posted by a Northern type-i
intermediate producer. The value of mismatch employment for a low-tech rm, JM , is the
same as the expression above but with i = M and j = L. Intuitively, the rms value from
a lled position is equal to a workers marginal value of production net of the wage, the
job-maintenance cost, and the expected capital loss owing to job destruction.
Given the meeting process described above, for i 2 fL,Hg the value of a vacancy for a
type-i rm, Vi, satises:
rVi =  c+ qi(Ji   Vi) + ILqH(JM   VL),
where: IL is an indicator function whose value is equal to 1 with i = L in CSM equilibrium,
while it takes a value of 0 in the event that i = H or in EPS equilibrium if i = L.
Workers For i; j 2 fL,Hg and i = j the value to a Northern worker of type i from being
employed by a type-j rm, Wi, satises:
rWj = wj   (Wj   Ui).
This equation says that the corresponding employment ow value to a worker is equal to
the wage paid in the position net of the expected capital loss owing to job destruction. The
value of mismatch employment for a high-skill worker WM is the same as the expression
above but with j = M and i = H.
For i 2 fL,Hg the value of unemployment for a Northern type-i worker, Ui, satises:
rUi = b+ fi(Wi   Ui) + IHfL(WM   UH),
where: IH is an indicator function whose value is equal to 1 with i = H in CSM equilibrium,
while it takes a value of 0 if i = L or in EPS equilibrium if i = H. It follows that unem-
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ployment ow values are equal to the sum of unemployment ow benets and the expected
capital gains from becoming employed.
2.1.4 Surpluses
The surplus of a match is equal to the sum of the capital gains that rms and workers obtain
from forming an employment relationship. Thus, for i; j; k 2 fL;Hg and i = j = k match
surpluses from high-skill workers matched with high-tech jobs and low-skill workers matched
with low-tech jobs, Sj, are given by:
Sj = Jj   Vi +Wj   Uk. (5)
With j = M , i = L and k = H the preceding equation also denes the surplus from
mismatch. In all cases, if the value of a particular job is positive for a rm, then free entry
into vacancy posting implies Vi = 0, which is what allows for the existence of both high- and
low-tech intermediate goods producers within any given country.
2.1.5 Wages
Let  2 (0,1) denote workers exogenously determined constant bargaining power. Nash
bargaining of wages without commitment to the future path of wages (that is, wages can be
instantaneously renegotiated given changes in the economic environment) implies a surplus
sharing rule by which a workers capital gain from becoming employed is a constant fraction
 of the associated surplus, and similarly a rms capital gain derived from forming an
employment relationship is a constant fraction 1   of the associated surplus. Thus, Nash
bargaining implies that for i,j,k 2 fL,Hg and i = j = k the wage wi is implicitly dened by:
(Wj   Uk) = 
1   (Jj   Vi).
In turn, the mismatch wage satises the equation above with j = M , k = H, and i = L.
Also, note that the average wage of low-skill workers, wL, is simply equal to wL, while
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the average wage of high-skill workers, wH , is:
wH =
"HwH + eMwM
1     uH ,
Finally, the Northern aggregate wage, W, is given by:
W =
"LwL + "HwH + eMwM
1  u .
2.1.6 Flow Equilibrium Conditions
Three equilibrium ow conditions must be accounted for, which dene: 1) the mass of
unemployed low-skilled individuals; 2) the mass of unemployed high-skill individuals; and 3)
the mass of mismatched individuals. Since all employment relationships end at exogenous
rate  and low-skill individuals exit unemployment at e¤ective rate fL, it follows that in
equilibrium the mass of low-skill unemployed individuals satises:
(   Lu) = fLLu. (6)
Using similar reasoning, the equilibriummass of unemployed high-skilled individuals satises:
(1     Hu) = f(H + IHL)Hu. (7)
Furthermore, high-skill workers become mismatch employed at e¤ective rate IHfL. there-
fore, the equilibrium mass of high-skilled workers employed by low-tech rms satises:
IHfLHu = eM . (8)
Of course, the total number of individuals employed by high-tech rms is:
"H = 1     Hu  eM ,
11
and the total number of low-skilled individuals employed by low-tech rms is:
"L =    Lu.
Note that the unemployment rate of low-skill workers is uL= , and, similarly, the unemploy-
ment rate of high-skill workers is uH=(1   ). Moreover, the rate of mismatch employment
to total high-skill employment is eM=(1     uH).
2.2 The Southern Economy
Recall that, following DMS, we assume that while the Southern labor force consists of both
high- and low-skill individuals, under autarky in the South only low-tech intermediate pro-
ducers exist whose input is used in the nal production of Southern goods. In turn, o¤shoring
of intermediate high-tech production for use as input in the multinationals production of
nal output in the North introduces a high-tech (o¤shoring) sector in the South.
Akin to the Northern economy, in the South low-skill workers are only productive in
low-tech intermediate rms, while high-skill workers can produce in both low- and high-
tech (o¤shore) intermediate rms. Under autarky the Southern economy is trivially in CSM
equilibrium and the Southern ratio of mismatch to total high-skill employment is equal to 1
(given no other employment alternative Southern high-skill workers nd it optimal to take
low-tech jobs).
For expositional brevity we omit full development of the Southern economy. All notation
and assumptions about the Southern economy are analogous to those noted earlier in the
development of the Northern economy under the appropriate congurations except for the
following. First, variables and parameters corresponding explicitly to the South are dis-
tinguished by use of an asterisk. Second, high-tech o¤shore variables and parameters are
denoted with an O (instead of an H). Third, in an equilibrium with trade the value of a job
to an o¤shore intermediate high-tech producer that is, the value to a high-tech intermediate
rm located in the South that employs a Southern high-tech worker and sells its production
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to the Northern multinational JO satises:
rJO = yO   c   cO   wO   (JO   V O),
where: cO is a xed ow cost specically associated with maintaining an o¤shore job and
posting o¤shore vacancies. It follows that the value of an o¤shore vacancy V O satises:
rV O =  c   cO + qH(JO   V O)
(note that in an equilibrium with trade total vacancies in the South v are equal to the
sum of Southern low-tech vacancies vL and o¤shore vacancies v

O; in addition, the fraction
of low-tech vacancies is L, and the fraction of o¤shore vacancies is 

O = 1   L). Fourth,
in similar spirit to DMS, we assume that autarky is consistent with the value of cO being
prohibitively high. However, a decline in cO to a su¢ ciently small value is consistent with
the world economy moving to an equilibrium with trade (for simplicity, we assume that trade
is associated with the value of cO having e¤ectively dropped to zero, therefore inducing entry
into the o¤shore market).
2.3 Equilibrium
Following DMS, our baseline world equilibrium assumptions are that: 1) under autarky the
North is in EPS equilibrium (while the South is trivially in CSM equilibrium); 2) under
trade high-skilled workers in the North become su¢ ciently pessimistic about their future
job market prospects triggering a switch to CSM equilibrium; 3) for simplicity, under trade
the wages associated with o¤shore employment are perceived by Southern high-skill workers
as being su¢ ciently high that they stop accepting low-tech jobs, triggering a switch to
EPS equilibrium. Unlike DMS, we later assess the impact of mismatch in the North by
considering an alternative trade equilibrium in which both the North and the South are in
EPS equilibrium. Moreover, we discuss why in autarky a CSM equilibrium in the North
would not emerge under our baseline calibration.
For expositional brevity, in the remainder of this section whenever possible we focus the
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discussion on the Northern economy. Analogous considerations to those presented, when
applicable, are straightforward for the South. Also, recall that in line with related literature,
we assume free entry into vacancy posting. This assumption implies that the value of a
vacancy for any intermediate producer is equal to zero.
2.3.1 Preliminaries
Key Equilibrium Variables Recall from earlier that the matching function m was as-
sumed to be increasing and concave in aggregate vacancies and aggregate unemployment.
Following related literature we assume that m = Avu1 , where: A is matching e¢ ciency;
and  2 (0,1) is the elasticity of matches with respect to aggregate vacancies. Let  = v=u
denote market tightness. It follows that the rate at which workers meet rms can be stated
as f = A, which is increasing in market tightness, and the rate at which rms meet work-
ers is q = A 1, which is decreasing in market tightness. It follows that key equilibrium
conditions can be stated in terms of market tightness (rather than aggregate vacancies and
aggregate unemployment) and also, given the surplus denitions and the Nash bargaining
surplus-sharing rules, in terms of surpluses (rather than agent-specic value functions).
Existence For EPS equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that the surplus from a match
between a low-skilled worker and a low-tech intermediate rm is positive and that the surplus
from a match between a high-skill worker and a high-tech intermediate rm is positive as
well. Solving explicitly for surpluses in EPS equilibrium (which is straightforward given the
denition of surplus from earlier as well as relevant value function statements) it follows that
yL > c+b and yH > c+b are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for, respectively, SL > 0 and
SH > 0 to hold.
For CSM equilibrium to be viable it must be the case that: SL > 0; SH  0; and
the surplus from a match between a high-skilled worker and a low-tech intermediate rm
(mismatch) is positive: SM > 0 (again, solving for SH , SM , and SL in CSM equilibrium is
straightforward given their denitions and relevant value function statements; in the event
that SH = 0 high-tech rms do not post vacancies meaning that with all individuals par-
ticipating in the labor force SL > 0 and SM > 0 are such that CSM equilibrium emerges
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trivially). Suppose this is the case. Then, subtracting the surplus SH from the surplus SM
and rearranging implies that:
SH   SM = yH   yM
r + 
. (9)
In words: the di¤erence between the surplus from a match between a high-skilled worker and
a high-tech rm and the surplus from mismatch is simply equal to a weighted di¤erence of the
value of output between these matches. Now, rearranging the surplus SM and substituting
in equation (9) yields:
(r +  + f)SM = yM   (c+ b)  fH
r + 
(yH   yM).
Therefore, SM is positive if and only if:
yM   (c+ b) > fH
r + 
(yH   yM). (10)
It follows from equation (9) that if yH > yM it is necessarily the case that SH > SM
(and SH > 0 if SM > 0). Furthermore, inequality (10) is satised (and hence SM > 0) if the
di¤erence between the output value of mismatch and the sum of unemployment ow benets
and the cost of of maintaining a job is larger than a weighted di¤erence between the value
of high-tech and mismatch intermediate output.
Note that, all else equal, the smaller the di¤erence between yM and yH is, as well as
the smaller H is, the more likely it is that inequality (10) is indeed satised. Intuitively,
as H ! 0 high-tech jobs become increasingly scarce, and in the limit they are entirely
unavailable meaning that high-skill workersoutside (high-tech) employment options do not
weigh on mismatch surplus. An analogous interpretation follows from considering the case
in which yM ! yH .
As noted earlier, EPS and CSM equilibrium congurations are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, as long as yL > c+b and yH > c+b, then EPS equilibrium always exists. Should
the preceding hold and the economys parameters be such that CSM equilibrium also exists,
then as noted in DMS whether the economy settles on EPS or CSM equilibrium can depend
on many factors, including, for instance, high-skill workers expectations about high-tech
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employment prospects.
Vacancy Creation Conditions Rearrangement of the Northern vacancy ow value equa-
tions along with free-entry into vacancy-posting and the denition of surplus and Nash bar-
gaining imply for i 2 fL,Hg the following Northern vacancy-creation conditions:
(1  )(iSi + ILHSM) = c=q (11)
These equations hold when the value of a particular type of job to a rm is positive, and
simply say that given free-entry into vacancy creation the expected gains from posting low-
or high-tech vacancies (the left-hand side) are equal to the expected costs (the right-hand
side). In the South, similar reasoning applies leading for i 2 fL,Og to the following Southern
vacancy-creation condition:
(1  )(iSi + (1  IO)HSM) = c=q, (12)
where: IO is an indicator function that equals 0 if i = L and the Southern economy is in
autarky and equals 1 if o¤shoring occurs and i = O or i = L.
2.3.2 Denitions
Given the development thus far, in all denitions that follow knowledge of the fundamental
vectors S and V is su¢ cient to solve for any other endogenous variables and equilibrium ow
equations of interest.
Definition 1: autarky equilibrium with North in EPS conguration and South in CSM
conguration. A steady-state autarky equilibrium with ex-post segmentation in the North
and (trivial) cross-skill matching in the South consists of a set of surplus values S = fSL,
SH , SL, S

Mg and a vector V = f, L, L, u, , L, u, eM , pH , pL, pLg such that:
1. The following are solved: the two corresponding Northern surplus equations implied
by equation (5) and the two analogous surplus equations for the South, the two cor-
responding Northern vacancy-creation condition equations implied by equation (11),
16
the single corresponding vacancy-creation condition for the South implied by equation
(12), the two Northern price equations (1) and (3) with  = 1 and the single analogous
(low-tech) price equation for the South, equations (6), (7), and the two analogous un-
employment equations for the South, and also the single Southern equation dening
mismatch employment analogous to its Northern counterpart (equation (8)).
2. SL > 0, SH > 0, SL > 0, S

M > 0.
Definition 2: trade equilibrium with both the North and South in EPS congurations.
A steady-state trade equilibrium with ex-post segmentation in both the North and South
consists of a set of surplus values S = fSL, SH , SL, SOg and a vector V = f, L, L, u, ,
L, 

L, u
, pH , pL, pL, pOg such that:
1. The following are solved: the two corresponding Northern surplus equations implied
by equation (5) and the two analogous surplus equations for the South, the two cor-
responding Northern vacancy-creation condition equations implied by equation (11),
the two corresponding vacancy-creation conditions for the South implied by equation
(12), the three Northern price equations (1), (3), (4) (with  = 0) and the single analo-
gous (low-tech) price equation for the South, equations (6), (7), and the two analogous
unemployment equations for the South.
2. SL >, SH > 0, SL > 0, S

O > 0.
Definition 3: trade equilibrium with the North in CSM conguration and the South in
EPS conguration. A steady-state trade equilibrium with cross-skill matching in the North
and ex-post segmentation in the South consists of a set of surplus values S = fSL, SH , SM ,
SL, S

Og and a vector V = f, L, L, u, eM , , L, L, u, pH , pL, pL, pOg such that:
1. The following are solved: the three corresponding Northern surplus equations implied
by equation (5) and the two analogous surplus equations for the South, the two corre-
sponding Northern vacancy-creation condition equations implied by equation (11), the
two corresponding vacancy-creation conditions for the South implied by equation (12),
the three Northern price equations (1), (3), (4) (with  = 0) and the single analogous
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(low-tech) price equation for the South, equations (6), (7), (8), and the two analogous
unemployment equations for the South.
2. SL > 0, SH  0, SM > 0, SL > 0, SO > 0.
In light of the preceding denitions, the denition of an autarky equilibrium with both
the North and South in CSM congurations is straightforward.
3 Calibration
The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1 and assumes a trade equilibrium with
the North in CSM conguration and the South in EPS conguration (this is consistent with
equilibrium Denition 3 above). The frequency is monthly, so the interest rates are set to
r = r = 0:004, which is consistent with an annual interest rate of 5 percent.
3.1 Northern Economy
As in Arseneau and Epstein (2014a), we assume that individuals with at least some post-
secondary education are high-skill workers while those with at most a high school degree
correspond to low-skill workers. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data shows that about
half of the U.S. population has at most a high school degree. Therefore, we set the fraction
of low-skilled individuals in the Northern economy to  = 0:5.
As noted earlier, the job market is characterized by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching
function. We set the elasticity of the matching function with respect to aggregate vacancies
 to 0:5, which is broadly in line with research surveyed in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The matching e¢ ciency parameter A is calibrated as follows. Using aggregate monthly
data on unemployment since 1951 that is available publicly from the BLS along with the
methodology in Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) and Shimer (2012), we nd that in the
U.S. the probability that an average unemployed individual nds a job within a month is
0:43: Given this gure, assuming an underlying Poisson distribution implies that the monthly
rate at which an average unemployed individual nds a job is 0:56. Therefore, the matching
e¢ ciency parameter is used to attain the steady state value of fuH+fLuL
u
= 0:56.
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The exogenous job destruction probability  is calibrated using data on aggregate un-
employment from the BLS. These data show that since 1951 the average US unemployment
rate is 0:058. Therefore, we pin down the job destruction rate by targeting the steady-state
value u = 0:058. In turn, the cost of posting vacancies c is used to target the ratio of aggre-
gate vacancies to aggregate unemployment: v=u = 0:68. This gure is obtained using data
on aggregate job openings from the BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey since
2000 (when rst available) along with the Conference Boards Help-Wanted Index from 1951
through 2000. Combined with the BLS time series for aggregate unemployment, these data
imply that in the U.S. the average ratio of aggregate vacancies to aggregate unemployment
is 0:68 in the post-war period.
We assume symmetry in bargaining power, so that  = 0:5. This parameterization has
the virtue that, in our model,  =  delivers an e¢ cient split of match surplus (see Hosios
(1990)). Broadly in line with Shimer (2005), unemployment benets b are set to deliver a 40
percent replacement rate of aggregate wages. In particular, we set b = 0:4wH"H+wMeM+wL"L
1 u .
For production, we normalize the intermediate input technology parameters so that zH =
zL = zO = 1. In addition, we follow DMS and assume that the technology parameter in
the nal low-tech goods aggregator is ZL = 1:6 and that the value of intermediate high-
tech production in the North is 12:5 percent higher than its low-tech counterpart. This last
assumption pins down the technology parameter of the nal-high tech goods aggregator ZH
and results in a wage premium of correctly match high-skill workers relative to correctly
matched low-skill workers of nearly 20 percent. In addition, we set the share of domestic
intermediate inputs in the multinationals production function to  = 0:9, broadly in line
with Burstein, Kurtz, and Tesar (2008), though lower than used in Arseneau and Leduc
(2012). We discuss the choice of the multinationals substitutability parameter  in the
following section, as it is relevant for wage di¤erentials in the South.
Finally, the analysis in Sicherman (1991) suggests that each year of overeducation rela-
tive to a jobs educational requirements induces an overeducation wage premium of nearly
4 percent relative to individuals with the required amount of education. Given that our
reference for the models high-skill workers are individuals with at least some post-secondary
education which can include attaining a college degree and higher we use the mismatch
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productivity parameter zM to target a conservative wage ratio of wM=wL = 1:135.
3.2 Southern Economy
Our Southern country is meant to be a representative emerging market economy. In par-
ticular, we have in mind countries classied as emerging economies by the International
Monetary Fund, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. Publicly avail-
able data from the World Bank shows that across our list of emerging economies the average
fraction of the population that completed at most a secondary education is about 0:8. There-
fore, we set the fraction of low-skilled individuals in the Southern economy to   = 0:8.
As in the North, the Southern job market is characterized by a standard Cobb-Douglas
matching function. In line with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) we set  = 0:5. Data
on worker ows is quite limited for emerging economies. Therefore, we calibrate the match-
ing e¢ ciency parameter A following Bosch and Maloney (2007), who calculate transition
rates for Mexico at quarterly frequency. We assume an underlying Poisson distribution and
use Bosch and Maloneys ndings to back out a representative implied monthly job nd-
ing rate for Mexico of 0:11. Thus, akin to the Northern economy we choose A so that
fLu

L+f
Ou

H
u = 0:11:
The exogenous job destruction probability  is calibrated using data on aggregate un-
employment rates from statistical agencies of nearly all our reference emerging economies.
Taken at face value, these data suggest an average unemployment rate across emerging
economies of about 10 percent. Therefore, we pin down the job destruction rate by targeting
the steady-state value u = 0:1. In turn, the cost of posting vacancies c is used to target
the ratio of aggregate vacancies to aggregate unemployment: v=u = 0:2. We obtain this
gure by taking at face value data on aggregate job openings from several emerging market
statistical agencies.6 In addition, recall that under trade we assume that the o¤shore-specic
ow cost is cO = 0.
As in the Northern economy, we assume symmetry in bargaining power so that  = 0:5.
6In particular, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, and Chile.
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Many emerging market economies have no formal unemployment insurance scheme, so we
take the midpoint between a lower bound of zero and the replacement rate in the North as
a reference point to set: b = 0:2w

Me

M+w

L"

L
1 u .
Turning towards production, we normalize zL = 1. In addition, we follow DMS and
assume that the value of Southern low-tech intermediate production is about 40 percent
of that of Northern high-tech intermediate production, which pins downs the technology
parameter ZL.
Finally, we pin down the multinationals substitutability parameter  by assuming a wage
ratio wO=w

L = 1:3. This wage ratio is higher than its counterpart in the North in the spirit
of the assumption that Southern high-tech workers nd o¤shore wages su¢ ciently high that
EPS conguration emerges under trade. As noted in Table 1, the resulting value of  implies
strong complementarity (the baseline calibration is such that for any target wO=w

L > 1 a
negative value for  always emerges).
4 Quantitative Results
As noted earlier, our baseline exercise involves assessing the impact of a trade liberalization by
comparing the benchmark trade equilibrium to an autarky equilibrium in which the North is
in EPS conguration and the South is trivially in CSM conguration. When implementing
the autarky, we assume that all country-specic parameters remain as in the benchmark
trade equilibrium. In addition, when the South is in a pre-liberalization CSM equilibrium
we assume a mismatch wage premium of 13:5 percent (as was the case for the North in CSM
equilibrium). This assumption pins down a value for the Southern mismatch productivity
parameter zM = 1:03.
We choose to compare the benchmark trade equilibrium to an autarky EPS equilibrium in
the North for two reasons. First, doing so allows our results to be more directly comparable
to those reported previously in DMS, who, as noted earlier, analyze a trade liberalization
under the assumption that high-skilled workers in the Northern economy become su¢ ciently
pessimistic about their future job market prospects such that it induces a shift from EPS
to CSM equilibrium. Second and most importantly an autarky equilibrium in which the
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North is in CSM does not exist under our baseline parameterization. This is because our
calibration, which is informed by observable data on both U.S. and emerging economy labor
markets, implies that under autarky the value of Northern intermediate high-tech production
is so much higher than the value of Northern intermediate low-tech production that the
mismatch surplus is driven below zero. Hence, mismatch is not supported in the Northern
autarky equilibrium under the baseline calibration.
4.1 Main Results
The baseline results are presented in Table 2. The switch from autarky (Case A) to o¤shoring
under the assumption that the North moves to a post-liberalization CSM equilibrium (Case
B) results in a decline in both the aggregate Northern unemployment rate, u, and aggregate
Northern wage, W. Thus, from the perspective of the Northern economy, the increase in
o¤shoring carries both a benet and a cost from the perspective of the aggregate labor
market the trade liberalization increases the number of people working, but the aggregate
wage declines.
Disaggregating to the sectoral level, an immediate consequence of o¤shoring is that
the multinational shifts high-tech production away from the Northern economy toward the
Southern economy. As a result, high-tech vacancies fall in the North. The resulting reduction
in demand for Northern high-skilled labor lowers wages in the high-tech sector. Faced with
declining wages and fewer job openings, high-skilled individuals become willing to accept
lower quality jobs in the low-tech sector, inducing a switch to CSM equilibrium. Indeed,
note that the Northern mismatch rate, eM= (1     uH), rises from 0 to 0:63. In spite of
lower vacancies in the high-tech sector, new job opportunities that arise from the willingness
of high-skilled individuals to accept employment in the low-tech industry help to push down
the high-skilled unemployment rate, uH=(1   ) by nearly 1:5 percentage points.
From the perspective of job creation in the low-tech sector, mismatch generates two
opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, because Northern low-tech rms now expect to form
matches with high-skill workers whose wages are higher than those of low-skill workers
because of their higher productivity and higher outside option (employment in high-tech
rms) the expected gains from posting a low-tech vacancy are reduced. However, this
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e¤ect is partially o¤set by the fact that low-tech rms encounter suitable job candidates
faster as a result of high-skilled participation in the market for low-tech jobs. All told, low-
tech vacancies decline, but by less than high-tech vacancies, making the share of low-tech
vacancies in the total vacancy pool, L, rise. Since low-skilled workers nd jobs at e¤ective
rate Lf; the unemployment rate for low-skilled workers declines nearly twice as much as
the unemployment rate for high-skilled workers. Moreover, given their higher job-nding
prospects, wages for low-skilled workers increase modestly as rms must compensate them
for their higher outside option.
All told, these results suggest that a trade liberalization that results in increased o¤-
shoring of high-skilled labor generates clear distributional e¤ects in the Northern economy.
It attens the wage distribution as wages in the high-tech sector fall sharply while wages in
the low-tech sector increase modestly.7 Unemployment is lower across the board, but the
impact is greater for low-skilled individuals.
In the Southern economy, the shift from autarky to trade results in an increase in both
the aggregate wage and aggregate unemployment. Since higher-skilled workers are now only
willing to accept o¤shore (high-tech) jobs, low-tech rms in the Southern economy encounter
suitable workers less frequently, which raises expected vacancy-posting costs. Consequently,
low-tech vacancies vL decline resulting in a substantial increase in the low-skill unemployment
rate, uL= 
 and a decline in the Southern low-tech wage wL. In turn, the combination of
Southern higher-skilled workers only being willing to accept o¤shore jobs in conjunction with
the limited o¤shore vacancies posted by the multinational is such that the unemployment
rate of higher-skilled Southern workers uH=(1  ) rises. However, since the value of o¤shore
production is substantially higher than that of low-tech rms, the average wage of high-skilled
workers under trade wH is much higher than their autarky wage.
7In related work, Arseneau and Epstein (2014b) introduces on-the-job search in the present framework
to better understand the response of the wage distribution to an increase in o¤shoring. This approach is
closely linked to Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Mortensen (2005), and Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2009)
and is supported empirically by Christensen, et. al. (2005).
23
4.2 The Role of Mismatch
We conduct a simple experiment that allows us to parse out the direct role of mismatch in the
adjustment of the Northern labor market to increased o¤shoring: Panel C of Table 2 shows
results from the model assuming that the North stays in EPS equilibrium post-liberalization
as opposed to switching to CSM equilibrium as in Panel B. Considering this third case allows
us to shut down the equilibrium shift that is central to the results presented in the previous
subsection as well as the results presented in DMS.
Comparing Panel C to Panel B makes it clear that if the Northern economy remains
in EPS equilibrium, wages are signicantly lower and unemployment is markedly higher
following the trade liberalization. We conclude that the role of mismatch is to substantially
mitigate the impact of o¤shoring on the labor market.
Intuitively, the benet of mismatch comes from the fact that it allows for sectoral real-
location of the labor market following a large shock. In other words, mismatch opens up
a number of additional employment opportunities for high-skilled individuals that would
otherwise be absent following the increase in o¤shoring. As high-skilled individuals take
advantage of these opportunities, labor market activity shifts across sectors in a way that
cushions the decline in wages and ultimately decreases unemployment. In absence of the
ability to engage in this sectoral reallocation, the Northern labor market is fully exposed to
the o¤shoring shock because the low- and high-tech labor markets are e¤ectively segmented.
The role of mismatch in adjusting to trade liberalization in our model echoes earlier results
by Albrecht and Vroman (2002), who examine the response to skill biased technological
change in a closed economy setting. This may not be surprising as an o¤shoring shock can
be thought of as a form of skill biased technological change in the sense that the reduction
in trade costs changes the production frontier of the multinational by making o¤shoring
possible.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct two sets of sensitivity analyses. The rst focuses on how the characteristics of the
multinationals production function shape the response of the labor market to an increase in
24
o¤shoring. The second set focuses on the size of the parameter space that supports mismatch
as an equilibrium outcome.
5.1 The Multinationals Production Function
By introducing a nal goods producing rm that uses a exibly parameterized CES aggre-
gator, our model allows international linkages to play a wide role in shaping results. We
examine the sensitivity of labor market outcomes to the size of the o¤shore sector and to
the complementarity versus substitutability of Northern and Southern inputs in the multi-
nationals production function.
5.1.1 Size of O¤shore Sector ()
Fig. 1 shows labor market outcomes following a trade liberalization that results in a switch
from an autarky EPS equilibrium to a trade CSM equilibrium (upper and lower panels on
the left) and from an autarky EPS equilibrium to a trade EPS equilibrium (upper and lower
panels on the right). In each case, the top panels present results for the unemployment rate
and the bottom panels present results for the wage. Each panel is constructed by varying the
share of o¤shored production in the high-tech good,  (shown on the x-axis), while holding
all other parameters of the model constant.
The gure shows that the baseline results are relatively insensitive to changing the o¤-
shoring share parameter. When the increase in o¤shoring induces a shift from EPS to CSM
equilibrium, the upper and lower panels in the left column show that aggregate unemploy-
ment decreases and aggregate wages fall sharply regardless of the parameterization for .
Similarly, the upper and lower panels in the right column show that when the economy re-
mains in EPS equilibrium, the unemployment rate rises rather than falls, and wages decline
even more sharply. Overall, these results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results and
suggest that the equilibrium shift, rather than the specic parameterization of the production
function, is much more important in determining the response of the labor market.
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5.1.2 Complementarity vs. Substitutability ()
Fig. 2 conducts a similar exercise as in Fig. 1, but now we vary the complementarity versus
substitutability of Northern and Southern inputs in the multinationals production function,
only. Compared to the case in which we varied , changes in  yield a story that is a bit
di¤erent. The panels in Fig. 2 show that the baseline results are robust provided Northern
and Southern inputs are su¢ ciently complimentary (i.e.,  is su¢ ciently negative). But,
as the two become more substitutable the e¤ect on the labor market and, in particular,
unemployment is quite di¤erent. For example, when the increase in o¤shoring induces a
shift from EPS to CSM equilibrium, the upper left panel shows that this change drives an
increase in low-skilled unemployment for low levels of complementarity. It is also interesting
to note that the parameter space over which CSM equilibrium is supported does not exist
for values of  above  4:4 (the shaded region in the gures two panels). In the next
subsection we investigate this existence aspect of the model more closely. The shift from EPS
equilibrium in autarky to CSM trade equilibrium shows that when Northern and Southern
labor are substitutable, there is a minimal impact of unemployment and the adverse e¤ect
of the high-tech wage is notably dampened.
5.2 How General a Result is Equilibrium Mismatch?
Our main results illustrate the importance of whether or not mismatch is a feature of the
post-liberalization equilibrium for how the labor market adjusts to o¤shoring. Implicit is the
fact that in our baseline parameterization both EPS (no mismatch) and CSM (mismatch)
equilibrium are feasible. How general a result is the coexistence of both types of equilibria
under trade?
Fig. 3 o¤ers some perspective on this. Holding constant all other parameters, the gure
varies the share of o¤shored production in the high-tech good, , along the x-axis and the
parameter governing the substitutability of Northern and Southern high-skilled inputs, ,
along the y-axis. Every point on the grid evaluates the conditions presented in Section 5.2
that tell us whether CSM equilibrium can obtain alongside EPS equilibrium.
The gure is divided into two regions. The (larger) shaded region to the left denotes the
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part of the parameter space in which both EPS and CSM equilibria coexist. The unshaded
(smaller) region to the right denotes that part of the parameter space where mismatch
cannot be supported in a trade equilibrium. Finally, the black line denotes that baseline
share parameterization of  = 0:9: The baseline substitutability parameter has  such that
Northern and Southern high-skilled inputs are strong complements in the multinationals
production function, putting the baseline model in a part of the parameter space where both
equilibria coexist and mismatch is feasible.
What is interesting about Fig. 3 is that an empirically relevant parameterization is one
in which the share of o¤shored production is relatively small, so that 0:9   < 1 (see,
for instance, Burstein, Kurtz, and Tesar (2008) and Arseneau and Leduc (2012)). Within
that range, mismatch only exists as an equilibrium outcome when domestic and foreign
high-skilled inputs are su¢ ciently complementary. While our parameterization of  satis-
es this criteria, there is considerable uncertainty regarding whether o¤shored production
should be viewed as a complement to or a substitute for domestic inputs. Fig. 1 suggests
that if one believes the inputs are substitutes (or mild complements with a su¢ ciently low
share of o¤shore activity), the labor market implications of o¤shoring could be much larger
because mismatch will not arise to help cushion the labor market e¤ects following a trade
liberalization.
6 Conclusion
We study the role of mismatch in the adjustment of the labor market to a trade liberalization
that results in o¤shoring of high-tech production. Our results suggest that mismatch helps
to mitigate the negative labor market consequences that arise from o¤shoring. The ability to
reallocate domestic high-skilled labor across both high- and low-tech industries dampens the
increase in the unemployment rate as well as the decline in wages that result from shifting
domestic production abroad. Our analysis also reveals that under our calibration the size of
the parameter space over which mismatch can arise as an equilibrium outcome is, in fact,
quite limited. Indeed, as long as the share of the o¤shored production is not too large, high-
skilled workers will only choose to accept jobs with low-tech rms if domestic and o¤shore
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high-tech production are su¢ ciently complementary.
In general, we view the limited subset of the parameters space in which mismatch can
arise as an equilibrium outcome as a limitation of the model presented in this paper. in order
to bring a calibrated version of the model more in line with observed data, the model needs
to be extended in a way that makes mismatch a more attractive proposition to both workers
and rms following trade reform. We pursue two such extensions in companion work. Arse-
neau and Epstein (2014b) introduces on-the-job search to the partial equilibrium framework
presented here, while Arseneau and Epstein (2014c) extends this modeling framework to a
general equilibrium open economy setting with endogenous directed search.
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Table 1 Baseline Calibration at Monthly Frequency
North South
Production Parameters
2.45 Multinational technology parameter: ZH -
0.99 Multinational share of domestic input:  -
-41.75 Multinational substitutability parameter:  -
1.60 Low-tech nal goods technology: ZL, ZL 0.60
1.00 High-tech intermediate production technology: zL, zL 1.00
1.00 Low-tech intermediate production technology: zL, zL 1.00
1.05 Mismatch intermediate production technology: zM -
Labor-Market, Population Parameters, and Other
0.004 Interest rate r, r 0.004
0.50 Share of low skill individuals:  ,   0.80
0.50 Worker bargaining power: ,  0.50
0.36 Flow unemployment benets: b, b 0.03
0.73 Vacancy and job maintenance ow cost: c, c 0.47
0.03 Job destruction rate: ,  0.01
0.50 Elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies: ,  0.50
0.87 Matching e¢ ciency: A, A 0.44
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Fig. 1 Sensitivity of labor market outcomes to share of o¤shoring in multinational produc-
tion function
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Fig. 2 Sensitivity of labor market outcomes to input substitutability parameter in multina-
tional production function
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Fig. 3 Existence of CSM and EPS equilibria (substitutability and share of o¤shoring)
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